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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of ·the

STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTA.H,
Plaintiff - .Appellant

v.s.

LEONARD :BRENNAN,Defendant -Respondent

RESPONDENT'S. BRIEF
AP·PEAL. FROM SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT
·COURT OF WEBER COUNTY,·
THE HONORABLE PARLEY E. NORSETH,
DISTRICT JUDGE

STATEMENT

OF FACTS

.This/... ~s. a prosecution for
driving
a mptor. vehicle
. . .
.
while under the influence of intoxicating liquor~ The
District Court, upon motion of Respondent directed a
verdict of . acquittal. The State seeks to have- th-e order
di~e~t~g ~~e- verdict ~eversed upon appeal.
.

.

.

~

.

Respondent wishes to set forth facts adduced upon
trial· of· this case in. ·greater detail thanl appellant has
done.
-Defendant was -proceeding easterly upon twelfth
street, in Ogden, just emerging from a sha.rp "S" turn.
(Tr. 23, 30, photograph). This road is asphalt, 23' 2"
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wide with no curb. The asphalt ends and a gravel or
dirt shoulder 20 feet wide begins with no line of demarcation or drop off. (Tr. 23) The road has no dividing stripe. (Tr. 37} The point of impact was upon the
paved portion of tbe road, not the shoulder, (Tr. 32).
The accident occurred about 7 :15 P.M. on March '26,.
1960. It was dusk, or dark, the defendant's headlights
were on, the street lights .were not lighted, th~ girPs
bicy-cle had no light, and an oncoming car may or may
not have had its lights on. (Tr. 28, 22, 24, 16, 26). The
girl was riding on-the left hand side of the road (Tr. 11).
There was no evidence of excessive speed. Defendant's
car was · partially off the hard surface, but otherwise
appeared, to be operating normally. (Tr. 20). Just
prior to impact, the car began to slide as if the brakes
had been applied suddenly (Tr. 21, 23}. Further facts
will be referred to in the argument.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE STATE DID NOT PRESENT EVIDENCE
SUFFICIENT T·O GO TO THE JURY ON THE
ISSUES OF NEGLIGENCE AND PROXIMATE
CAUSE.
Res~ondent,

in moving for dismissal, argued three
grounds: (Tr. 63-64).
(a)

41~6-44,,

U.C.A. 1953, is violative of Article 6,
Sec~ion 23, and Article 1, Section 24, of the Constitution
of the State of Utah.
(b) . Criminal negligence, as opposed to siniple negligence, is required to convict under 41-6-44, U.C.A.,
2
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1953, when the State charged an indictable misdemeanor, and this burden was not met.
(c) The State did not make a sufficient showing to
go to the jury on the issue of even simple negligence
and proximate cause.
The trial court granted respondent's motion, and
the State has taken this app~al. Argument . (a) will
be reviewed under point II. Argument (b) has been
disposed of by the recent decision of this court in State
vs. Johnson, 364 Pac. 2d 1019, and will not be argued
in this appeal. It should be noted that the Johnson
decisio-n was made September 13, 1961, the very day
this case was determined, and the trial court and counsel
did not have it available when this case was decided.
Our major argument concerns the lack of evidence
of .even simple negligence. No violation of statute or
ordinance was claimed or shown; the State ( App. Brief
page 6 and Tr. 4-5) rests its proof on the civil doct~rines
of "failure to keep safe and proper control of a motor
vehicle" and "failure to keep a safe a proper lookout."
As to control, the State made no claim for and
offered no evidence to show excessive speed. The eye
witnesses agreed the car was not entirely upon the
hard-top, but was partially upon the dirt or gravel side.
This is not negligence, as we will argue infra. The
witness Janet Sandberg, age 13, was upon a bicycle
across the road, although her position varied in her
testimony from being at the curve itself (Tr. 14) to
being even with the rear of defendant's car (Tr. 13).
The trial court could see and observe the conduct and
demeanor of all the witnesses, and its interpretation of
3
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the evidence should be given considerable weight. The
other witness to the accident, James Abbott, age 19,
testified he watched the car come around the curve and
it was partially on the hard top and partially off. Other
than this it seemed to be operated in a normal manner
(Tr. 20). Just prior to impact, the car started to slide
much as if the brakes had been suddenly applied. (Tr.
23-24). K:aylene Smart, the injured girl, age 12, was
present at the trial but did not testify.
The evidence relied upon to show a failure to keep
a proper lookout seems to be simply that defendant
did not stop in time to avoid the accident, from which
it can be argued that if he had kept a proper lookout,
he could have stopped. In its brief, appellant asserts
that defendant's car struck Kaylene Smart before the
brakes were applied. (Page 6). The evidence did not
show this-only that "identifiable" skid marks began
at the point of impact. There were other brake marks
on the ground, but the witness could not positively tie
them into the defendant's car (Tr. 39). Abbott's testimony indicated the brakes "\Yere applied prior thereto
(Tr. 23). At the very minilnum, the brakes would
have been applied a sufficient distance away to allow
for the reaction tune of the defendant, since the identifiable skid marks began at the point of impact, not
after.
l{aylene Smart "\Yas riding an unlighted bicycle
(Tr. 16) in violation of 41-6-90, U.C.A., 1953, 'vhich provides:
"Every bicycle operated during the nighttime
shall be equipped "\vith a la1np on the front ex.:.
4
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hibiting a white light visible from a distance of
at least 500 feet to the front and with a red reflector on the .rear of a type approved by the
state road commission which shall be visible
from fifty to 300 feet to the rear when directly
in front of lawful upper beams of head lamps on
motor vehicles. A red light visible from a ·distance of 500 feet to the rear may be used in addition to the red reflector."
She was riding on the left hand side of the road, in
violation of 41-6-87, (a) and (c) U.C.A., 1953 which
read as follows :
"(a) Every person operating a bicycle upon a
roadway shall ride as near to the right side of
the roadway as practicable, exercising due care
when passing ·a standing vehicle or one proceeding the same direction.
(c) Whenever a usable path for bicycles has
been provided adjacent to a roadway bicycle
riders shall use such path and shall not use the
roadway."
Contributory negligence is not a defense to this action,
but certainly is entitled to be considered in determining
proximate cause and the question of whether defendant was negligent. Kaylene was riding an unlighted
bicycle on the wrong side of the roadway, and there
were no street lights operative. The lights of the
Abbott car may have been on, shining into defendant's
eyes as he came out of the turn. No evidence was
offered as to the color of Kaylene's bicycle, or of her
clothing on the night in question. Kaylene was "dodg.5
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ing" rocks being thrown at her by neighborhood boys,
one of the rocks struck her bicycle just prior to the
accident, and she was looking back to see where the
rocks were coming so she could dodge them (Tr. 11,
15 & 16). Both Abbott and Sandberg testified she was
riding on the shoulder, but neither witness watched her
as the car approached and the accident occurred on the
hard top. When questioned by police, defendant said
she had "darted" in front of him. (Tr. 56).
It is not negligence to drive a car partially off the
hard surfaced portion of the road, 60 C.J.S. 1\Iotor
Vehicles, Sec. 276. No Utah statute concerns it. The
Virginia Supreme Court in Boggs v. Plybon, 160 S.E. 77,
espoused this principle and said:
"We have seen that this defendant, on a dark
night, drove his car along the outside edge of
a slightly curved road and on its right-hand side,
measured by the direction in \vhich he \vas going.
Had he failed to keep to the right and had a collision followed, he might have been held liable.
He did keep to the right and, by chance, a trifle
too far to the right, so the his right wheel ran
from the hard surface into the soft shoulder. If
there was negligence at all, this \vas it. It is not
claimed that he failed in any duty afterwards.
It is not per se negligence for the outside \Vheel
of any auto1nobile, traveling at a reasonable rate,
to run off the macada1n. Indeed, it i-s an everyday
occ nrrence. If plaintiff is to prevail, \ve must
hold that such an incident is in itself negligence,
and this we cannot do no matter what standards
6
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we n1ight adopt measuring the duty to a guest."
(Italics added) .
The Utah cases of Davidson v. Utah Independent
Telephone Co., 34 Ut. 249, 97 Pac. 124, and Christensen
v. Utah Rapid Transit Co., 83 Ut. 231, 27 Pac. 2nd 468,
have approved this rule. In the Davidson case this
court said:
"But counsel for appellant contended, if we correctly understand their position, that the word
"street" in this kind. of a case should be restricted
to mean only that portion of the highway laying
between the sidewalk ·areas on either side, and
where, as in this case, no part of the street has
been laid off, set apart, or used as a sidewalk,
an imaginary line should be drawn between that
part of the street which would constitute a sidewalk if one were established and the balance of
the highway,, and, if it were shown that the accident causing the injury complained of happened
within the sidewalk area so established, a recovery could not be h~d, and that the court should
have so instructed the jury. The rule, as we understand it, is that where, as in this case, the full
width of the street is open for travel, and there
are no excavations, trenches, embankments, or
visible objects of any kind to indicate that a
porti.on of the street has been set aside or used
as a sidewalk, a party traveling along such highway may use any part of it as may suit his convenience or taste, and he is entitled to protection
against the unlawful acts of other persons or
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corporations." (Italics added)
In any event, such action could not be a proximate
cause of injury because the impact took place upon the
pavement.
Skidding or sliding is not evidence of negligence
or lack of control. 5A Am. Jtir. Automobiles, Sec. ~41;
Rodriguez v. Abadie, 168 So. 515, wherein the Supreme
Court of Louisiana said :
"It is a matter of common knowledge that an
automobile will skid when brakes are suddenly
applied in an emergency. The fact that defendant's car skidded in this case is, we think, mute
evidence of an attempt on the part of defendant's
daughter to perform all acts possible to avoid
the accident, when faced 'vith an emergency."
Defendant's duty to keep a lookout is not absolute,
but only reasonable. Morrison vs. Perry, 104 Ut. 151,
140 Pac. 2nd 772. Defendant was not required to anticipate he would be faced with an emergency, and could
presume that the laws of the road would be observed
by others.. No evidence "~as introduced by the State
to show defendant should have anticipated a bicycle on
the road or any other emergency. The case of Richards
v. Palace La~tndry 55 U t. 409, 186 Pac. 439, is of significance here. In that case a motorist sa"' a bicyclist
approaching on the proper side of the road, did not
continue to 'vatch hiin, and ''Then the bicycle suddenly
appeared in front of his car was unable to avoid a
collision. In affir1ning a non suit at the close of plain-~
tiff's case, this court said:

8
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

"While in case the street or highway is not used
by others one may drive on any part thereof,
. yet, when a traveler passes from the right to
the. left of the center of the street he, to say the
least, loses some of his rights, and may not be
heard to complain of the conduct of those who
are on the :proper side of the street to the same
extent as though he also were on the proper side.
In Presser v. Dougherty, 239· Pa. 312, 86 Atl.
854, the decision is correctly reflected in the headnote, where the law is stated thus:
"The mere fact that plaintiff collided with the
automobile does not raise any presumption of
neglige:q.ce, especially where the plaintiff was
riding on··the wrong side of the street, and there
was no· evidence that the automobile was being
operated at a. dangerous rate of speed.
In Babbitt, Motor Vehicles, section 356, it

·is said:

.

;

"A driver on the right~hand side of the road has
~:right to assume that vehicles coming in the
opposi~e. direction will not violate the law of the
·:road."
. That is, that they will continue in the direction they are coming on the proper side of
the road or street.
In Ballard v. Collins, supra, the rule is
tersely stated in the following words:

-G;

"A person using a street as a highway has
the right to presume that the law of the road

9
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will ·be observed."
The Presser v. Dougherty case quoted with approval is very close to the instant case, except that it
occurred in broad daylight. In that case, a bicyclist
pedaling down the wrong side of the road was struck
by an oncoming car that had just turned into the street.
The Pennsylvania Supreme court held that as a matter
of law no negligence was shown on the car driver, and
affirmed a non suit at the close of plaintiff's case.
The fact an accident happened is no evidence of
negligence, 5A Am. Jur. Automobiles Sec. 923. Appellant, in the direct examination of a State witness, introduced defendant's statement that the girl on the bicycle had "darted" in front of him. The State is bound
by its evidence of his explanation, unless it offer substantial evidence to show that the- statement made by
the defendant is not true. 23 C.J.S. Criminal Law
Sec. 909, page 583. Here the State has not produced
evidence to dispute this statement, but all the evidence
substantiates it. The evidence shows that Kaylene
Smart, in the dark on an unlighted bicycle, sudden!~
"dodged" or "darted" in front of defendant's car; that
defendant slammed on his brakes, skidding, in an effort
to avoid the collision, but was unable to do so.
Although "negligence" as here used is a civil term,
it must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt as an element of the crime charged. State vs. Hendricks, 123
Ut. 267, 258 Pac. 2nd 452. Unless the proof is such as
to preclude every reasonable hypothesis except that
which it supports, and is 'vholly consistent with the defendant's guilt and inconsistent with his innocence, it

1()
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will not be sufficient. 23 C.J.S. Criminal Law Sec. 910,
State v. Gutheil, 98 Ut. 205, 98 Pac. 2nd 943, State v.
1/ u rch, 100 U. 41--l, 115 Pac. 2nd 911.
POINT II..
41-6-44, U.C.A. 1953, IS IN VIOLATION OF
ARTICLE VI, .SECTION 23, OR ARTICLE I, SECTION-· ·24; OF .THE UTAH· CONSTITUTION.
Appellant took the position in its information
(R-~2), upon the Trial (Tr. 4, 5, 67, 68) and upon this
appeal (Appellants Brief, Page 5) that 41-6-44 proscribes 2 crimes, one an indictable misdemeanor, the
other a simple misdemeanor. This may not be so. The
statute is similar in form, nearly identical, to 57-7-111
(a), U.C.A. 1943. This court has held that section
defined only one crime, driving under the influence,
with two punishments, the greater one for second offenders. State vs. Ste~vart, 110 Ut. 203, 171 Pac. 2d 383.
Thus, the proper procedure under that Section was to
try first the question of guilt or innocence of driving
under the influence, and if convicted, then try the question of the second conviction. It was reversible error to
admit evidence of other convictions during trial of the
offense. State vs. Stewart, supra.
Therefo.re, if two crimes are now imposed, it is
by virtue of the . 1957 amendment. The title of this
Act is

"DRIVING WHILE UNDER THE INFLU·. ENQ.E OF LIQUOR .
. "An Act Amending Sections 41-6-43 and 61-6-44,

11
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Utah Code Annotated 1953 Relating to Driving
a Motor Vehicle While Intoxicated or under the
Influence of Narcotics; and Providing· for an Increased Penalty."
The title does not refer to any new or additional
crime, but refe.rs only to "increased punishment", apparently for the same: crime. We submit that· if in 'fact
there are two crimes; by virtue of the 1957 enactment,
the new ~rime is not set forth clearly ~ the title of the
Act, and in fact is ~ot set forth at all, in violation of
Article yi, Section 23 of the Utah Constitution:
"Except general appropriation bills, and bills
for the codification and general revision of laws,
· no bill shall be passed containing more than one
subject, which shall be clearly· expressed in its
title."
We think the 1957 Legislature did not intend. to
enact a new crime, but only to provide an additional
penalty for negligent driving. This is because (1) prior
to 1957 this c()urt had .construed 57-7-111 (a) as containing one cr4ne, (2) the 1957 amendment did not
change the first parag1;aph of the section, which. defines the crime, (3) the 1957 .amendment lifted out the
second offense provision and substituted the negligence
provision, ( 4) the ·clear reading of the Act and Section D thereof "* * * such defendant" indieates the
added penalty is to be considered only after conviction.
The conclusion is that the ·statute defines one offense, the driving of a vehicle while under the influence
of intoxicating liquor, but provides two punishments.

12
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This \YP submit 1s .violative of Act. I, Sec. 24, Utah
Consitution:
"All laws of a general nature shall have uniform
operation."
Disparate punishment may be nonviolative of this
provision if it applies equally to all members of a class,
and if the elassification is a reasonable one. This court
has considered the reverse of this in State v ..Twitchell,
8 Utah 2d 314, 333 Pac. 2d 1075. As we read that case,
it holds that the negligent ho1nicide enactment is a
reasonable classification, and a defendant may not complain because his punishment (as a drunken driver) iR
greater than it would have been had he been sober. We
differentiate this case from Twitchell by (1) the Legislature did not declare the negligent driving while intoxicated to be a crime, but merely attempted to add
an additional penalty to .an existing offense, and (2)
the classification here is unreasonable because it provides a highly increased penalty solely on the basis of
doing a lazvful act. This defendant was not charged
\vith, and it has never been contended that he violated
any statute or ordinance other than intoxicated driving.
Under this law, one driver who while intoxicated, violates speed laws, runs stop signs, etc., and only manages
to destroy prope!ty or injure himself has committed
a simple misdemeanor; the other intoxicated driver
u·ho t·iolates no laws but injures a person is subject to
the heavier offense.

POINT III.
THE ·TRIAL COURT PROPERLY REFUSED
13
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TO SUBMIT TO THE JURY THE QUE.STION OF
DEFENDANT'S GUI;LT OR INNOCENCE.
Appellant, in its information (R-22), at the- trial
(Tr. 4, 5, 67, 68) and upon this appeal has taken the
position that 4-16-44 contains two offenses. The elements ·of the crime charged, as asserted and -relied
upon by appellant, are:
"1. Operating a motor vehicle,
2. While under the influence of intoxicating liquor,
3. Negligence,
4. Proximately causing or contributing to

5. Injury to another person.
As we have seen under Point I, elements 3 and 4
were not proved; as set out in Point II, this act contains one crime, not two. Therefore, at the close of
the State's case, the court was faced with this:
(1) The State had charged defendant with violation
of 41-6-44, U. C.A. 1953.
(2) The State had set forth in its information,

opening statement, argument, proof and instructions
five elements it was relying upon.
(3) The State had failed in its proof on two elements.
( 4) There was no included offense, because the
statute defendant was charged under contained but one
.
crime.

Under thes-e circumstances, the State having failed
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to prove the elements it claimed essential to the offense,
we submit the trial court was completely ·correct in
granting the defendant's motion and .di;recti~g a verdict.

CONCLUSION
The Order of the District Court directing a
cf acquittal should be affirmed.
, ·'·

v~rdict

Respectfully submitted,

HOWELL, STINE AND OLMSTEAD
By Richard W. Campbell
Attorneys for Defendant
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